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Abstract
Th is contribution seeks to answer the question whether the new civil service legisla-
tion that entered into force in 2015 in the Czech Republic led to the depoliticization 
of the country’s ministerial bureaucracy. To that end, we compare the career back-
grounds of top civil servants before and aft er the entry into force of the new Civil 
Service Act. Th e article examines the career backgrounds of the persons appointed 
as ministerial deputies between 2013 and 2018, focusing on their last “pre-deputy” 
jobs and considering a broader set of their career attributes. A focus on the previous 
job reveals that even before the law was introduced, bureaucrats constituted the 
largest share of appointees, and their share even increased with the new legisla-
tion. Th e incidence of deputies appointed directly from party-related jobs dropped 
considerably. However, when a broader set of career attributes is considered, the 
share of partisans among the pre-2015 deputies nearly matches that of the career 
bureaucrats. Ostensibly political careers among the post-2015 deputies declined 
but remain signifi cant. Hence, there has been a decline in the open politicization 
of the ministerial bureaucracy aft er 2015. Party political eff ects also matter, as the 
new ANO party, aft er entering the executive, has taken a diff erent approach to top 
bureaucratic appointments than the other major governing Czech parties. Typical-
ly, deputies appointed into the positions under the ANO’s control would not have 
links to the party itself but would be recruited via non-party channels, e.g. from 
pre-political networks of the ANO ministers and leaders. Consequently, though less 
politicized by party agents, the current Czech system is more a product of choices 
made by government ministers of the day than a stable arrangement resulting from 
fi rmly established norms and rules.
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1. Introduction
Civil service politicization is a widespread strategy used by politicians worldwide, 
whether to increase control over the public policy formulation and implementation 
or reward their loyal political supporters for their service. Although the scope and 
the tools of politicization vary, it represents one of the cornerstones of politico-ad-
ministrative relations. Numerous case studies and comparative analyses cover the 
phenomenon (Bach and Veit 2018, Dren et al. 2012, Nahtigal and Haček 2013, etc.), 
and there are well-documented cases focusing on established Western democra-
cies and the new democracies alike. In post-communist Central Europe, politiciza-
tion has been scrutinized by academics in Slovakia (e.g. Staroňová and Rybář 2020, 
Staroňová and Adamicová 2016, Beblavý et al. 2012), Poland (Gwiazda 2008, Mazur 
et al. 2018) or Hungary (Meyer Sahling 2008, Gajduschek 2007). Surprisingly, the 
nature and extent of civil service politicization has been relatively underresearched 
in the context of the Czech Republic.
Before 1989, the Czech Republic (then a part of Czechoslovakia) belonged to 
the Soviet-dominated Eastern Bloc, in which politicization of the state administra-
tion was one of the crucial principles of centralized state management (Scherpereel 
2004). Th e fi rst attempts to establish an independent, merit-based professional civil 
service took place only aft er the transition to democracy, especially in the process 
of accession to the European Union.
Th e European Commission, in charge of monitoring the progress of the then 
candidate countries of Eastern Europe, highlighted the adoption of the Civil Service 
Act (CSA) as one of the conditions to be met by the Czech Republic before joining 
the European Union. Th e successive Czech governments, however, were very reluc-
tant to fulfi ll this obligation. Eventually, in 2002, the Civil Service Act was adopted 
(Act No. 218 / 2002), but it was never implemented in practice (Scherpereeel 2009). 
Only a decade aft er gaining the EU membership, in 2014, did the Czech Republic 
adopt a CSA that was to provide a comprehensive basis for the professional civil 
service (Špaček 2018, 166 – 168). It entered into force in January 2015.
Th e absence of legislation protecting civil servants from undue political pres-
sures may suggest that political interference has been widespread. However, empir-
ical analyses of the extent and nature of the civil service politicization are scarce. 
Moreover, most academic works focus on the period before the adoption of the 
2014 Civil Service Act and, thus, do not consider the extent of change brought about 
by the new legal framework. In this article, we seek to contribute to our understand-
ing of civil service politicization by examining the most senior civil servants’ ap-
pointments in the Czech ministerial bureaucracy. We analyze some of the top civil 
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servants’ critical career characteristics to understand their relative importance in 
the process of appointment to the top bureaucratic posts in the Czech government. 
Our primary goal is to answer the following question: Did the new civil service law 
result in a depoliticization of the top tier of the Czech ministerial bureaucracy ? We 
do so by maping out the career backgrounds of top civil servants before and aft er 
the 2014 Civil Service Act entered into force. Besides, we also use a party-political 
perspective of top bureaucratic appointments: We examine the diff erences in the 
profi les of top civil servants appointed by the major Czech political parties. In the 
rest of the article, we proceed as follows. Firstly, we briefl y review the literature on 
civil service politicization in the Czech context and discuss the new civil service 
legislation’s adoption. Secondly, we examine the profi les of top civil servants ap-
pointed to their positions in 2013 – 2018. We explore the relative importance of, 
among other, party-political, expert, and administrative attributes of their careers 
and examine the appointments sanctioned by major Czech political parties. Finally, 
we assess whether and how the new civil service legislation aff ected depoliticization 
in the top layer of the Czech ministries.
2. Contradictory accounts of state politicization in the czech 
republic
Studies of civil service politicization in the Czech context tend to concentrate on 
the period before the adoption of the 2014 Civil Service Act. Furthermore, to our 
knowledge, no academic works are focusing on careers and backgrounds of senior 
civil servants in the Czech state administration. Th e Czech case is usually studied 
in a broader comparative context (i.e. in-depth analyses of the Czech administra-
tion are mostly absent) with the typical conclusion that the Czech state administra-
tion is less politicized in the region of post-communist Europe. Scherpereel (2009, 
190 – 191) describes the process of passing civil service law between 1998 and 2002 
as driven by the EU accession. Even though the law was passed in 2002, it was ve-
hemently opposed by the then main opposition party and never entered into force. 
Consequently, the situation wherein “leading positions in the ministries and dis-
trict offi  ces could be awarded to party loyalists who met minimal professional stan-
dards” persisted (Scherpereel 2009, 207). Klíma (2020, 85 – 86) even claims that “the 
party elites intentionally endeavoured to conserve an extreme dependency of civil 
servants on the current political representation.” In Klíma’s view, each government 
change would lead to personnel earthquakes in ministries, resulting in suboptimal 
performance of the state administration.
In contrast, a large-N survey of civil servants carried out by Kohoutek and 
Nekola (2016) concludes that ordinary civil servants believed that administrative 
jobs were fi lled primarily on the basis of the professional qualities of the candi-
dates. Nevertheless, the survey also concluded that hiring and promotion to higher 
managerial positions in the state administration were perceived to be infl uenced 
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by political superiors (Kohoutek and Nekola 2016, 95). In other words, fi lling top 
management positions in the state bureaucracy was determined by the candidates’ 
political affi  liation. Hiring and fi ring at lower levels was infl uenced by what the 
authors call functionally hidden politicization (personal acquaintances or personal 
contacts to a politician). Most ordinary offi  cials reported no politically motivated 
interventions in their work.
Comparative works that include the Czech Republic put the extent of politi-
cization in the country into perspective. Meyer-Sahling and Veen (2012) conclude 
that within the region of post-Communist Central and Eastern Europe, the Czech 
case belongs to the group of countries where the overall politicization of senior civil 
service reaches medium levels: It is more politicized than in the Baltic states but 
less politicized than its Central European neighbors Poland, Hungary, and Slovakia. 
Similarly, a 22-country comparison covering fi ve regions on three continents puts 
the Czech Republic among countries with medium-politicized state administra-
tions (Kopecký et al. 2016). Th e study also identifi es party actors’ desire to control 
policy-making in the state administration as the primary motivation for politiciza-
tion. As summarized by Kopecký (2012, 80), “politicization of the state is neither 
absent nor particularly pervasive” in the Czech case. While the top bureaucratic 
posts are heavily politicized, political appointments are rare in lower managerial 
positions and low-level jobs.
Importantly, there are signifi cant diff erences in approaches to civil service 
politicization by individual Czech political parties. According to Kopecký and 
Spirova (2011), some parties display well-coordinated mechanisms for patronage 
appointments. Th ese are either the older parties, which have more prolonged and 
uninterrupted histories, clear constituencies, and established structures, e.g. the 
Christian Democrats (KDU-ČSL), or parties that have evolved organizationally 
since the 1990s and for which building of patronage mechanisms has become part 
of their organizational maturity, e.g. the Civic Democrats (ODS) and the Czech 
Social Democratic Party (ČSSD). In contrast, newer parties lack such mechanisms. 
In these parties, patronage appointments are made in an ad-hoc manner and based 
almost exclusively on the leaders’ individual preferences.
3. The 2014 civil service act
When the European Commission assessed the civil service status in the new mem-
ber states, it concluded that the Czech Republic was the only post-communist coun-
try that did not have a civil service law in place. Th e change of attitude of the Czech 
government took place only aft er a threat of sanctions from Brussels. Th e govern-
ment of the Social Democratic Prime Minister Bohuslav Sobotka responded in 2014 
by passing the civil service legislation, which entered into force in January 2015. 
Its goal was to prevent excessive replacements of civil servants aft er the elections 
79
The Politics of Appointment of Top Civil Servants: Career Backgrounds and Civil …
leading to government change. In contrast to the pre-2014 situation, civil servants’ 
status would be governed by a specialized law and not by the ordinary Labor Code.
One of the fundamental changes introduced was a separation of political and 
administrative positions in the ministerial hierarchy. Besides government minis-
ters, special posts of deputy ministers (the “political deputy” or “náměstek člena 
vlády” in Czech) were created. Up to two such posts could be fi lled at each ministry 
by the line ministers, who could hire and fi re them at their discretion. Th e rest of 
the bureaucratic positions at each ministry were to be fi lled on the basis of merit. 
Th is permanent civil service hierarchy consisted of three managerial layers, with the 
so-called specialized deputy ministers (the “professional deputy” or “náměstek pro 
řízení sekce” in Czech) on top, followed by Directors of Departments in the middle, 
and the Heads of Units representing the lowest managerial layer. Th e post of Sec-
retary-General (“státní tajemník” in Czech) was established at each ministry. Th e 
central role of the Secretary-General, who is functionally in an equal position with 
Professional Deputy Ministers, is to manage the organizational aspects of their min-
istries. Crucially, all these positions were to be selected on the basis of merit, and a 
system of performance evaluation free from political interference was to be applied.
Although establishing an organizationally and functionally distinctive author-
ity to manage the civil service had been contemplated, eventually, a decision was 
made that would subsume it under the existing system of state institutions. Th e 
Civil Service Section was set up at the Ministry of the Interior, headed by the Dep-
uty Minister of Interior for the Civil Service (“Náměstek ministra vnitra pro státní 
službu” in Czech). Th e Section issues civil service regulations binding on all civil 
servants and is in charge of recruitment into the civil service. Its agenda mostly 
covers organizational aspects of the civil service and management of service and 
labor relations. Th e position of its head, nicknamed the “Supreme Bureaucrat” (“su-
perúřadník” in Czech), highlights a delicate balance established by the Civil Service 
Act between concerns of those who wished for a depoliticized state administration 
and those striving for more political control. Th e Supreme Bureaucrat is appointed 
to the post by the government for six years. Th ough formally in the Deputy Min-
ister of Interior position, he is neither a professional deputy minister nor a typical 
political deputy minister at the ministry. His powers include the right to appoint 
the members of the selection committees in charge of civil service recruitment, in-
cluding the Secretaries-General of the line ministries. However, the ministers have 
the right to nominate a portion of selection committee members and thus do have 
an infl uence over the recruitment process. Besides, being a Deputy Minister at the 
Ministry of Interior, the Supreme Bureaucrat’s formal superior is the minister him-
self, which opens the possibility of political pressures on the civil service (Pichrt et 
al. 2015).
Other aspects of the civil service legislation further question the extent of de-
politicization at the ministries, three of which deserve special mention here. First-
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ly, the law stipulates that professional deputies may deputize their ministers in the 
meeting of the government ministers and the parliamentary and Senate committees. 
Th e extent of such practice is unknown, but there is a risk of civil servants openly 
taking up party-political roles in deputizing their political superiors. Secondly, the 
government had the right, once a year, to issue a reorganization of the line minis-
tries, leading to mergers and the abolition of organizational units and, subsequently, 
to layoff s. In 2018, for example, due to the passing of the new organizational struc-
ture of line ministries, the positions of 23 professional deputy ministers were abol-
ished (Horák 2020). Since the freshly installed government made the decision, it 
was widely believed to be motivated by the desire to get rid of the top civil servants 
appointed during the previous government. Th irdly, an amendment to the Civil 
Service Act passed in early 2019 changed the status of Secretaries-General and re-
laxed the procedure of hiring new civil servants. Secretaries-General, who manage 
personnel matters in their ministries, may now be recalled from their positions by 
the government (previously they could be removed only in a disciplinary proce-
dure). Furthermore, the new hiring rules make it easier to select candidates from 
outside the state administration. According to critics, both measures make it easier 
for the elected politicians to infl uence the supposedly merit-based recruitment in 
the state bureaucracy (ČTK 2019).
4. Data and methods
Th e principal question we aim to answer in this contribution is whether the 2014 
Civil Service Act has resulted in a depoliticization of the Czech ministerial bureau-
cracy. Given the multi-faceted nature of the concept of civil service politicization, 
we limit our analysis to the top layer of ministerial bureaucracy: deputy ministers 
before the 2014 CSA and professional deputies (hereaft er only “deputies”) aft er the 
adoption of the CSA. Hence, we concentrate on what Peters and Pierre (2004) call 
formal politicization, i.e. an opportunity to infl uence new offi  cials’ recruitment. 
Moreover, we narrow the focus of our analysis to select the deputies’ career attri-
butes, with the expectation that ostensibly party-political backgrounds (see below) 
of deputies signal the crucial role of political connection for getting the top ad-
ministrative job. Conversely, career paths without a signifi cant party-political ele-
ment signal that other, presumably technical and specialist, attributes account for 
appointments to the top administrative positions. We believe this relatively simple 
analytical approach is justifi able when academic works on Czech civil service po-
liticization are scarce, and research into career patterns in the Czech ministerial 
administration is virtually non-existing.
Our analysis considers all persons appointed as deputies between January 
2013 and December 2015 and all professional deputies appointed between Jan-
uary 2015 and December 2018. By this, we focus on the posts that fall into the 
category of top ministerial civil servants who are supposedly selected on the basis 
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of merit. Th us, we exclude the political deputy ministers appointed aft er January 
2015. Th e following criteria determine the choice of the time frame: It covers the 
full duration of three cabinets (the Rusnok “presidential” cabinet of 2013, the So-
botka left -right coalition government of 2014 – 2017, during which the CSA was 
adopted, and the Babiš I single-party minority government of 2018). We also add 
deputies in their positions in the fi nal months of the center-right Nečas cabinet in 
the fi rst six months of 2013 and consider the early period of the Babiš II two-party 
minority cabinet appointed in mid-2018 (see Table 1). Because the kind of polit-
icization we investigate is related to government changes, the latter two cabinets 
are included to increase the number of government turnovers. Th e selection of 
our time frame was also impacted by data availability: We used Freedom of In-
formation requests that we addressed to all government ministries to obtain the 
names and terms in the offi  ce of all deputies. However, we were not successful 
in getting systematic data from the period before 2013. Th irteen out of fourteen 
Czech ministries released the data for the 2013 – 2018 period, while the Ministry 
of Labor and Social Aff airs refused to share any substantial information and was 
thus excluded from our analysis. Th e tenure of each deputy was then linked with 
the individual ministers and coalition governments who oversaw their appoint-
ment. As the CSA entered into force in January 2015, our data cover approximate-
ly the same time before and aft er it became eff ective.
Table 1
Party composition of Czech governments, 2013 – 2018
Cabinet Duration Party composition Period covered in the Analysis
Nečas 2010–2013 ODS, TOP09, LIDEM 1/1/2013–10/7/2013
Rusnok 2013–2014 Caretaker government 11/7/2013–29/1/2014
Sobotka 2014–2017 ČSSD, ANO, KDU-ČSL 29/1/2014–13/12/2017
Babiš I. 2017–2018 ANO 13/12/2017–27/6/2018
Babiš II. 2018–on ANO, ČSSD 27/6/2018–31/12/2018
Source: Authors
Given that the deputies’ offi  cial biographies were not made available by the 
ministries, we had to rely on open-source information like websites of the minis-
tries, newspaper articles, personal webpages, and party statements, as well as vari-
ous offi  cial documents available online. By combining these sources, we could con-
struct a dataset containing the names, tenures, and genders of all deputies between 
2013 and 2018. We also collected information about their last occupation before 
being appointed to the posts of deputies. Furthermore, we managed to trace which 
political party was given the informal right to put forward the persons appointed 
as the pre-CSA deputies. Linking deputies to the party-political background of the 
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government ministers would not provide complete and reliable information about 
their political connection because most Czech governments were composed of sev-
eral political parties, and the coalition partners typically had the right to nominate 
their deputies in the ministries controlled by other parties.
Altogether, we managed to collect basic data on 216 deputies, 145 serving be-
fore the adoption of the CSA, and 71 deputies appointed under the new legislative 
framework. We inductively constructed fi ve groups of deputies on the basis of their 
last pre-deputy occupation: 1. politicians (elected offi  ceholders and political advi-
sors), 2. career bureaucrats, 3. private sector positions, and 4. public sector posi-
tions. We also identifi ed the fi ft h group, positions in the non-governmental sector. 
Even though such inductive categorization slightly diff ers from the ones seen in 
academic literature (e.g. Meyer-Sahling 2008), it captures a variety of backgrounds. 
Also, it provides suffi  cient grounds for distinguishing between party-political posts 
(category 1), bureaucratic positions (category 2), and other jobs (categories 3 to 5).
Considering the last pre-deputy position may not be suffi  cient to capture the 
complexity of the career backgrounds of the top civil servants. Th us, we attempt-
ed to construct more complex “typological profi les” of persons appointed to the 
post of deputies. We tried to capture a more complex career profi le beyond the 
last pre-deputy jobs, taking into account whether the person’s last occupation is 
congruent with his or her previous career path. To that end, we examined whether 
the deputies had run for elected offi  ce on a party ticket, served in the capacity of 
offi  cially representing a political party, whether they have had a record of working 
in a specifi c sector, etc. Given the incomplete information about the deputies’ career 
paths, such an endeavor is necessarily tentative and needs to be understood as such. 
We inductively identifi ed four broad career trajectories for the deputies: partisans, 
partisan-specialists, experts, and career bureaucrats, according to the dominant 
career experience in the last decade before becoming deputies. We can also dif-
ferentiate between party-related career backgrounds (typological profi les 1 and 2) 
from other, non-party career paths (types 3 and 4). Such information enables us to 
draw tentative conclusions about the extent of top civil service politicization and the 
scope of change caused by the new CSA.
5. Empirical results
5.1 Previous positions of top civil servants
Th e fi rst perspective we adopt considers the last occupation of the persons before 
being appointed as deputies. We were surprised to fi nd out that even before the 
adoption of the CSA (i.e. in 2013 and 2014, N=145), the largest group (N=57 or 
39.3 %) of deputies came from positions assigned to career civil servants. A ma-
jority of them came from lower managerial positions within their ministries. Th us, 
their appointment to the position of a deputy can be interpreted as their profes-
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sional career advancement. A number of them had held positions as deputies at 
another ministry, managerial positions in the Government Offi  ce, or positions in 
Diplomatic Corps.
Politicians (N=34, 23.5 %) constitute the second-largest supply of deputies. 
Some deputies were appointed directly from polico-advisory positions. One can 
identify several spokespersons, assistants to elected offi  cials, and various political 
advisors. Besides, elected offi  cials constitute a small but signifi cant supply of top 
civil servants. Th e group thus includes former mayors, members of parliament, 
elected offi  cials in regional assemblies, and senators who lost their seats in unsuc-
cessful reelection bids and were subsequently appointed as ministerial deputies.
Private and public sectors supplied an equal number of deputies (in both cas-
es N=25, 17.2 %). Th ere was no type of private or public organization that would 
dominate: In the case of the former, deputies coming from large corporations (e.g. 
banks, insurance, and other credit companies) seem to be most prevalent, but sev-
eral people from small companies and even self-employed persons (e.g. physicians) 
can be detected, too. Similarly, there is no dominant pattern among deputies coming 
from public organizations, as nationwide, regional, and even local-level organiza-
tions supplied future ministerial deputies. NGO representatives represent the fi ft h 
group of people appointed as deputies. However, given their small number (N=4, 
2.6 %), they do not constitute a signifi cant career background in the top Czech civil 
service.
To summarize, career bureaucrats constitute the largest group of future dep-
uties before the adoption of the Civil Service Act. Politicians, especially those from 
lower political advisory posts, and unsuccessful elected offi  cials account for about a 
quarter of deputies. In addition, public and private sector organizations seem to be 
equally important in supplying top civil servants. One can conclude that a diversity 
of backgrounds had been typical for the Czech top civil servants, with ostensibly 
political positions playing an important, though not a dominant role.
Our data show that the adoption of CSA further contributed to the rise in the 
importance of career bureaucratic position holders in the appointment of top civil 
servants. Between 2015 and 2018, 47 out of 71 newly appointed deputies came from 
bureaucratic career positions (66.2 %). Most of them advanced to their positions 
from lower managerial posts in their ministries. Among the appointments from 
outside the state administration, public sector job holders (N=12, 16.9 %) outnum-
ber those from the private sector (N=7, 9.9 %). Th e number of ostensibly political 
post holders diminished further, making up only 7 % (N=5) of the new deputies. A 
provisional conclusion presents itself that the adoption of the CSA decisively con-
tributed to a decline in the importance of party-political contacts in top civil ser-
vants’ appointment.
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Table 2











Bureaucrats 57 39.3 47 66.2
Politicians 34 23.5 5 7.0
Private sector 25 17.2 7 9.9
Public sector 25 17.2 12 16.9
NGOs 4 2.8 0 0.0
Total 145 100.0 71 100.0
Source: Authors
Nevertheless, such interpretation should be taken with caution. As we ex-
plained above, focusing exclusively on the newly-appointed deputies’ last position 
may be misleading because it reveals little about the overall career paths of top bu-
reaucrats. Other aspects of their careers, including previous engagement in the par-
ty-political, expert, and other types of activities, should be taken into account.
5.2 Career trajectories
Although we admit that our data on career paths are incomplete, we identifi ed four 
ministerial deputies’ tentative typological career profi les. Firstly, some of them are 
partisans. Th ey had a history of acting on behalf of a political party in various 
capacities, e.g. ran on party tickets for elected offi  ce or held a position within the 
party hierarchy. Th ey may have briefl y occupied positions in public or semi-public 
organizations, but their engagement could usually be attributed to them being party 
members or party agents. Th ere is no discernable record of them working in posi-
tions that would be considered to give them a professionally relevant background 
for their careers in the position of deputies.
Secondly, there are partisan-specialists. Even though their careers are also 
linked to political parties, they diff er from the partisans because their education 
and work experience indicate a substantive experience and skills received inde-
pendently of their engagement in party-political activities. In other words, they 
were party agents, but they simultaneously cultivated professional expertise that 
was later directly relevant in their state administration jobs. Career bureaucrats 
represent the third typological profi le of the deputies. Th eir career paths reveal 
little or no engagement in party-political activities. Th eir most signifi cant career 
trace is long-term permanent work in state administration, typically (though not 
exclusively) at a ministry where they got the top civil service appointment. Finally, 
outside experts represent the fourth type of deputies. Like career bureaucrats, they 
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display no career traits linked to party-political activities. Unlike them, however, 
their previous careers evolved outside state administration, in expert and profes-
sional positions, regardless of their employment sector. Typically, they combined 
public and private sector work experience. Crucially, throughout their careers, they 
had accumulated expertise that came to be relevant for their state administration 
appointments. As seen in Table 3, the share of career civil servants has increased 
since the adoption of the CSA. Even before the legislation was introduced, career 
bureaucrats were the largest group among the deputies, constituting 43.4 % of top 
civil servants. Since 2015, their share has reached three-fi ft hs of all deputies. Th e 
most remarkable change occurred in the incidence of “pure” partisans appointed to 
the top administrative posts, as it dropped from 40 % to 14.1 %. A share of experts 
also increased from 14.5 % to 22.5 %. Regardless of the appointment period, the 
number of party-experts remained low, constituting only 2.5 % of cases before 2015 
and 4.2 % since 2015.
Table 3












Bureaucrat 63 43.4 42 59.2
Partisan 58 40.0 10 14.1
Party-Expert 3 2.1 3 4.2
Expert 21 14.5 16 22.5
Total 145 100.0 71 100.0
Source: Authors
Comparing career profi les with the last job of deputies before their appoint-
ment confi rms our provisional conclusion about a decline in the importance of 
ostensibly partisan backgrounds. Th e share of career bureaucrats among deputies 
before the CSA entered into force was the largest among all groups. However, the 
examination of the broader aspects of career backgrounds also reveals that some 
party activists had gained managerial experience in public and private sector jobs 
just before being appointed as deputies. In other words, a portion of (future) depu-
ties had been politically involved before (or alongside) their careers in private and 
public sectors. Because of our data’s incomplete nature, it is impossible to establish 
distinctive career patterns based, for example, on sequence analysis that could re-
veal more nuanced career paths.
Th e number of deputies with a party-political connection aft er 2015 is higher 
than initially indicated by examining the deputies’ last occupations. Moreover, a 
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typological profi le approach shows that partisans and party-experts’ combined in-
cidence nearly matched that of career civil servants in the pre-CSA cohorts. Two out 
of fi ve deputies appointed before the new CSA was implemented had an undeniable 
record of working for a political party that nominated them. Career bureaucrats 
dominate the post-2015 top civil service; however, some 16 % of them still display 
distinctive linkages to political parties. Hence, our data show that even though the 
politicization of the merit-based top civil service has been reduced, individuals with 
a party-political connection continue to play a signifi cant role. Still, it is worth men-
tioning that many of them do possess relevant professional qualifi cations.
5.3 Party differences
Our data also allow for a tentative exploration of diff erent approaches to top civil 
servants’ appointments by governing political parties. Th e pre-CSA appointments 
can be directly attributed to individual ruling political parties on the basis of pub-
lic statements of ministers and party leaders. In addition, government ministries 
headed by ministers from diff erent parties tended to display diff erent attitudes 
towards fi lling deputies’ posts. Th ere were apparent diff erences between the Civ-
ic Democrats (ODS) and the Social Democrats (ČSSD) on the one hand, and the 
ANO (Action of Dissatisfi ed Citizens) on the other. ODS and ČSSD have been two 
traditional post-1989 parties that dominated the Czech political scene for two and a 
half decades following the Communist regime’s breakdown. Th ey had a developed 
territorial party organizational structure and a sizeable membership, at least by the 
post-Communist standards. In contrast, ANO has come to dominate Czech politics 
since 2017, but it was organizationally diff erent from its two more established com-
petitors. It has been a top-down political entrepreneur party with limited territori-
al organization and membership, fi rmly controlled by its founding leader Andrej 
Babiš (Kopeček 2018).
Both ODS and ČSSD took advantage of politicized appointments to the top 
administrative jobs, but each approached civil service politicization diff erently. 
ODS used political appointments extensively during the ODS-led Nečas govern-
ment: Deputies appointed by the previous government were dismissed, and party 
loyalists, with a long record of working for ODS, were typically appointed. Shabu 
(2013) reported there were 22 ODS deputies at the end of the Nečas cabinet, most of 
them also serving in the subsequent caretaker Rusnok cabinet. Similarly, ČSSD took 
advantage of their control over ministries (during the ČSSD-led Sobotka cabinet). 
However, instead of fi ring the inherited deputies en bloc, the Social Democratic 
Ministers would typically increase the number of top civil servants and fi ll the new-
ly created posts with their members.
On the other hand, ANO approached the ministerial bureaucracy diff erently. 
Th e party presented itself as a team of experienced managers and non-politicians 
who do politics diff erently. Typically, deputies appointed into the positions under 
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party control would not be ANO members but would be recruited from pre-politi-
cal networks of ANO ministers. Th ere is some evidence that a share of deputies was 
recruited from the Agrofert company, a corporation owned by the ANO founder 
Andrej Babiš. Several newly appointed deputies admitted they were approached by 
Babiš himself, or by his associates, to take up posts in the ministerial bureaucracy.
Aft er the adoption of the CSA, the governing parties’ opportunities to directly 
control appointments of deputies were reduced. Nevertheless, anecdotal and indi-
rect evidence suggests that governing parties did fi nd their ways to infl uence the 
selection process of new deputies. Again, diff erences between ČSSD and ANO, the 
two main governing parties in the post-CSA era, seem to persist. Th e number of 
deputies in the ČSSD-led ministries tended to grow due to the passing of annual 
reorganizations of the ministries. Th e new appointees oft en had a connection to the 
party. Deputies in the ANO-led ministries typically lacked a direct linkage to the 
party. Besides having a personal connection to some of the leading fi gures of the 
party, some of the new “ANO deputies” also possess undisputable public reputation 
and strong professional credentials.
Moreover, there seems to be little evidence for purges of the top civil servants 
in the ANO-controlled ministries: At least until the end of 2018, we see some reduc-
tion of positions in the ministerial bureaucracy, but the extent of changes was not 
excessive. In addition, there is another diff erence between ČSSD and ANO. While 
ČSSD would seldom miss the opportunity to appoint their people into the desig-
nated political deputy ministerial posts (allowed by the new CSA), ANO ministers 
largely refrained from the practice. One can assume that putting forward party affi  l-
iates into openly political state bureaucratic jobs would run contrary to the ANO’s 
image of a new party representing a clean break with the past practice of excessive 
party control of the state institutions.
Th ese observations are consistent with the conceptualization of ANO as a 
“technocratic populist” party (Havlík 2019). Its executive leaders are reluctant to 
engage “traditional” bureaucracies, put emphasis on pragmatic “what works” pol-
icies, and follow highly personalized strategies both in personnel recruitment and 
decision-making (Drápalová and Wegrich 2020, 3).
6. Conclusion
Th is study’s main goal was to shed some light on the nature and extent of politi-
cization of the Czech civil service by examining the career profi les of ministerial 
deputies who constitute the top layer of ministerial bureaucracy. To that end, we 
studied the background of deputy ministers before and aft er the adoption of the 
2014 Civil Service Act. Firstly, we examined the last occupation of the persons who 
were appointed the ministerial deputies. In the pre-CSA period, the largest share of 
deputies came from positions of civil servants, followed by people who came from 
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various party-political posts. Aft er entry into force of the new civil service legisla-
tion, the share of political backgrounds of the ministerial deputies declined, and the 
role of career bureaucrats was further strengthened.
Secondly, we presented four tentative typological career profi les of the min-
isterial deputies that consider a broader range of their career traits. Seen from this 
perspective, career civil servants were still the largest group of people appointed 
to the posts of deputies in the old administrative system. However, party poli-
ticians ranked a strong second largest category. Here too, the new civil service 
legislation seems to matter, as the importance of ostensibly party-political careers 
declined aft er 2014. In other words, we detected a shift  towards a less politicized 
state administration at the level of deputies. However, a brief overview of other as-
pects of civil service legislation reveals that the sustainability of this development 
hinges upon the willingness of government ministers to maintain the status quo. 
In case the government decides to embark upon the reorganization of the minis-
terial hierarchy, allowed by the legislation, ministerial deputies may be fi red. Th e 
adoption of new Civil Service legislation in 2014 may signal a shift  from partisan 
politicization to bounded and open politicization (e.g. Meyer-Sahling 2008) in 
that top offi  cials are more frequently appointed from the ministerial administra-
tion (bounded politicization) aft er the elections, and / or are replaced by people 
from outside the political environment.
We also considered diff erent approaches of major political parties towards the 
politicization of top civil service. ODS and ČSSD, two major established parties, 
extensively used the opportunity to shape the top layer of ministerial hierarchy. In 
contrast, ANO, the post-2017 hegemon in the Czech party politics, adopted a dif-
ferent strategy: Instead of putting forward deputies linked to the party, it recruited 
a portion of “its” deputies through personal networks of the key party leaders. Such 
a strategy may refl ect the fact that ANO is a new and organizationally underdevel-
oped party. However, it may well refl ect a trend towards higher personalization of 
ministerial appointments that rests less on the mediating role of party headquarters 
and puts a premium on personal resources of the individual offi  ceholders, as detect-
ed by Staroňová and Rybář (2020) in a slightly diff erent context.
Aft er the introduction of the Civil Service Act, the Czech Republic seem to 
resemble the public administrations where most senior offi  cials are promoted inter-
nally from positions within the bureaucracy (Derlien 2003; Hustedt and Salomon-
sen 2014; Veit and Scholz 2016). In a way, it represents a case between, for example, 
the Spanish or Portugese high politicization and Danish non-politicization models 
(see Bach et al. 2020). However, the current setting of the Czech system is more a 
product of choices made by government ministers of the day than a stable arrange-
ment resulting from fi rmly established norms and rules. New positions can still be 
created relatively quickly, and the ministers do have tools to infl uence the outcomes 
of bureaucratic recruitment. In contrast to Germany, where the interdepartmental 
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mobility is relatively low (Veit and Scholz 2016), the number of Czech ministerial 
deputies with working experience at several ministries is relatively high.
As the present work is based on incomplete data and works with tentative ca-
reer profi les of senior civil servants, more empirical research is needed to establish 
concrete career patterns and sequences of career development of the administrative 
elites. Moreover, the diff erence of various party approaches to civil service politici-
zation needs to be reexamined by expanding the time frame in which bureaucratic 
careers are examined, with the primary aim to include more governing political 
parties into the analysis. In addition, patterns of civil service politicization should 
include organizations other than government ministries, e.g. state-owned enter-
prises, executive agencies, and regulatory bodies.
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